Impacts of  the 14th November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake on three waters systems in Wellington, Marlborough and Kaikōura, New Zealand: Preliminary observations by Hughes MW et al.
306 
Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, Vol. 50, No. 2, June 2017 
1 Corresponding Author. Department of Civil & Natural Resources Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch 
matthew.hughes@canterbury.ac.nz (Member) 
2 GNS Science, Lower Hutt 
3 Department of Civil & Natural Resources Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch 
4 Opus International Consultants Limited, Wellington 
5 Marlborough District Council, Blenheim 
6  Wellington Water, Wellington 
IMPACTS OF THE 14TH NOVEMBER 2016 KAIKŌURA 
EARTHQUAKE ON THREE WATERS SYSTEMS IN 
WELLINGTON, MARLBOROUGH AND KAIKŌURA, 
NEW ZEALAND: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
Matthew W. Hughes1, Mostafa Nayyerloo2, Xavier Bellagamba3, 
Jonathan Morris4, Pathmanathan Brabhaharan4,  
Stephen Rooney5, Erica Hobbs5, Keith Wooley6  
and Steve Hutchison6  
(Submitted March 2017; Reviewed April 2017; Accepted May 2017) 
ABSTRACT 
We present preliminary observations on three waters impacts from the Mw7.8 14th November 2016 Kaikōura 
Earthquake on wider metropolitan Wellington, urban and rural Marlborough, and in Kaikōura township. Three 
waters systems in these areas experienced widespread and significant transient ground deformation in response to 
seismic shaking, with localised permanent ground deformation via liquefaction and lateral spreading. In 
Wellington, potable water quality was impacted temporarily by increased turbidity, and significant water losses 
occurred due to damaged pipes at the port. The Seaview and Porirua wastewater treatment plants sustained 
damage to clarifier tanks from water seiching, and increased water infiltration to the wastewater system occurred. 
Most failure modes in urban Marlborough were similar to the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence; 
however some rural water tanks experienced rotational and translational movements, highlighting importance of 
flexible pipe connections. In Kaikōura, damage to reservoirs and pipes led to loss of water supply and 
compromised firefighting capability. Wastewater damage led to environmental contamination, and necessitated 
restrictions on greywater entry into the system to minimise flows. Damage to these systems necessitated the 
importation of tankered and bottled water, boil water notices and chlorination of the system, and importation of 
portaloos and chemical toilets. Stormwater infrastructure such as road drainage channels was also damaged, 
which could compromise condition of underlying road materials. Good operational asset management practices 
(current and accurate information, renewals, appreciation of criticality, good system knowledge and practical 
contingency plans) helped improve system resilience, and having robust emergency management centres and 
accurate Geographic Information System data allowed effective response coordination. Minimal damage to the 
wider built environment facilitated system inspections. Note Future research will include detailed geospatial 
assessments of seismic demand on these systems and attendant modes of failure, levels of service restoration, and 
collaborative development of resilience measures. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
We present preliminary observations of impacts on three 
waters systems (potable, waste and storm water) in wider 
metropolitan Wellington, the Marlborough region, and 
Kaikōura, Aotearoa/New Zealand, resulting from the Mw7.8 
14th November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake. Significant ground 
surface rupture and seismic shaking [1-5], and secondary co-
seismic phenomena such as landslides [6], caused damage and 
disruption to regional transportation and electrical 
infrastructure lifelines [7, 8], while seismically-induced soil 
liquefaction had localised impacts [9]. The three waters 
systems (herein ‘three waters’) in urban centres and smaller 
rural communities in affected regions were also impacted to 
varying degrees, with both immediate and longer-term 
consequences for system functioning and levels of service. 
Important insights into three waters seismic performance were 
previously gained through the 2010-2011 Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence (CES), as well as general trends (albeit 
to different infrastructure component specifics) in worldwide 
earthquakes [10-13]. Particularly for the 22nd February 2011 
Christchurch Earthquake, the close proximity of causative 
faults to Christchurch generated strong ground motions [14, 
15], and triggered widespread liquefaction and permanent 
ground deformation that impacted the natural and built 
environments [16, 17]. Both transient and permanent ground 
deformation led to severe and extensive damage to the potable, 
wastewater and stormwater systems in Christchurch City and 
surrounding population centres [18-28]. Key nodes such as 
supply wells, reservoirs, pump stations and treatment plants 
were impacted; distribution/collection networks showed 
distinct patterns of damage corresponding to severity of 
transient and permanent ground deformation; and the age and 
construction materials of buried pipelines and their constituent 
components. Lessons from the CES three waters impacts and 
recovery provide a significant body of knowledge with which 
to understand patterns of damage resulting from the 14th 
November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake, including key 
similarities and differences between these events. 
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Building upon other initial lifelines reconnaissance 
assessments [29], presented below are more detailed 
preliminary observations of impacts on the three waters 
systems of Wellington, the Marlborough region and Kaikōura 
in particular, gathered during field investigations and system 
assessments conducted by researchers, asset managers and 
consultants. These observations lay the foundation for ongoing 
research on three waters systems, to help inform 
implementation of earthquake resilience initiatives.       
STUDY AREA OVERVIEW 
Here we focus on the wider metropolitan Wellington, 
Marlborough (specifically, the town of Blenheim, the rural 
Awatere Water Supply irrigation scheme in the Seddon area, 
and a rural irrigation scheme in the area around Ward), and 
Kaikōura (Figure 1). Wellington is Aotearoa/New Zealand’s 
capital, and is the country’s second most populous city with a 
population of ~405,000. As the seat of national government 
and home to its ministries, disruption to Wellington’s essential 
services has significant potential ramifications in the event of 
disaster. Prior to 14th November 2016, initiatives were 
underway to address the city’s three waters seismic resilience, 
as understanding of potential impacts from proximal fault 
rupture and seismic shaking has improved [30-32]. 
In Marlborough the resident populations of Blenheim, Seddon 
and Ward are ~30,000, ~500 and ~900, respectively. Blenheim 
is a regional centre servicing agricultural, horticultural, 
forestry and viticultural industries in the wider area. It is also a 
transit hub for Aotearoa/New Zealand’s State Highway 1 and 
a main trunk railway line, and accordingly has many tourist 
and visitor accommodation businesses. Both Ward and Seddon 
have local agricultural industry serviced by local businesses, 
with Seddon also having salt and lime production operations.  
 
 
Figure 1. (a) Modelled maximum Peak Ground Velocity (PGV; cm/s) [4, 5] for central Aotearoa/New Zealand from the 14th 
November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake. Locations of study areas (b-d) are shown. (b-d) Three waters damage locations; Selected 
Strong Motion Station locations (yellow triangles) shown, with measured Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) and PGV values 
(cm/s); horizontal (h) and vertical (v) motions shown. Road networks also shown. (b) Wellington study area, with location of 
Seaview Wastewater Treatment Plant (Figure 2). SEVS = Seaview Station, FKPS = Frank Kitts Park Station, PIPS = Aotea Quay 
Pipitea Station. (c) Marlborough study area, with documented damage locations in Blenheim (Figure 3). See Figures 4-5 for 
Blind River Tanks observations and Figures 6-8 for Ward damage observations. BWRS = Waikakaho Road Station, MCGS = 
Marlborough Girls College Station, SEDS = Seddon Fire Station, WDFS = Ward Fire Station. (d) Kaikōura study area, see 
Figure 9 for Esplanade damage observations. KIKS = Kaikōura Station. 
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Across the Marlborough region there were prior impacts from 
the Mw5.7 21st July 2013 Seddon Earthquake, and the Mw6.6 
16th August 2013 Lake Grassmere Earthquake [33, 34]. 
Following some minor damage observed in these prior events, 
the Mw7.8 14th November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake afforded 
the opportunity to re-visit the region to observe impacts on 
Blenheim facilities, storage and pipe systems in Seddon, and a 
private water supply scheme in Ward. 
Kaikōura’s resident population is ~2,000. Kaikōura is also an 
agricultural service centre for pastoral and dairy farming in its 
hinterland, but is also a domestic and international tourist 
destination renowned for its mountainous coastal landscapes, 
opportunities for outdoor activities and to view marine 
wildlife, and for seafood delicacies. Kaikōura’s transient 
population increases in summer with seasonal hospitality 
workers and tourists. 
Seismic demand placed on the Wellington, Marlborough and 
Kaikōura areas by the Mw7.8 14th November 2016 Kaikōura 
Earthquake can be visualised with modelled regional 
maximum Peak Ground Velocity (PGV; cm/s) values [4-5] 
(Figure 1a). In the Wellington area, at Seaview the measured 
horizontal and vertical Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) 
values were 0.19 g and 0.10 g, respectively; horizontal and 
vertical PGV values were 37.14 cm/s and 8.93 cm/s, 
respectively. In the Wellington Central Business District 
(CBD), horizontal and vertical PGA values ranged 0.17-0.28 g 
and 0.04-0.08 g, respectively; horizontal and vertical PGV 
values ranged 34.17-54.13 cm/s and 8.93-15.95 cm/s, 
respectively (Figure 1b). In the Blenheim area, horizontal and 
vertical PGA values ranged 0.17-0.27 g and 0.04-0.09 g, 
respectively; horizontal and vertical PGV values ranged 18.83-
47.15 cm/s and 7.32-9.43 cm/s, respectively (Figure 1c). In 
Seddon, measured horizontal and vertical PGA values were 
0.81 g and 0.19 g, respectively; horizontal and vertical PGV 
values were 88.97 cm/s and 27.40 cm/s, respectively (Figure 
1c). In Ward, measured horizontal and vertical PGA values 
were 1.31 g and 0.87 g, respectively; horizontal and vertical 
PGV values were 106.97 cm/s and 44.98 cm/s, respectively 
(Figure 1c). Shaking levels are ~2 times stronger than 
experienced during the 2013 Lake Grassmere event, especially 
in Ward [33]. In Kaikōura, measured horizontal and vertical 
PGA values were 1.31 g and 0.87 g, respectively; horizontal 
and vertical PGV values were 106.97. The high values in 
Ward and Kaikōura reflect their close proximity to fault 
rupture zones, and lower values experienced in Seddon, 
Blenheim and Wellington reflect their increasing distance 
from the primary rupture zone [1, 2]. Some variability in 
shaking levels in the vicinity of each strong motion station is 
expected due to different soil conditions and topography. 
Below we describe initial functional impacts from this 
seismicity on three waters systems, with commentary on 
system performance and service level restoration.                 
THREE WATERS IMPACTS 
Wellington 
Potable Water System 
The Te Marua water supply reservoir ponds have a diameter of 
~37 m, are ~4.5 m high and are usually full. They are 
relatively modern and as expected by asset managers there 
was no major structural damage to these or treatment plants, 
and connection pipes were undamaged. System assessments 
by Wellington Water showed that earthquake shaking 
disturbed accumulated sediments in reservoirs and pipes, 
resulting in increased turbidity through the network. In some 
parts of the region, increased turbidity was sufficiently high to 
change the water color, with attendant reports from customers. 
Supply was stopped temporarily to allow the sediments to 
settle, and affected customers were advised to run their taps 
until the water was clear. Within 24-30 hours from the event 
the turbidity level returned to normal and customer complaints 
had reduced. There was a slight increase in E. coli after the 
earthquake, but that went back to normal within 2 days. 
In the days following the event, Wellington Water inspected 
all key components of the potable water network including 
supply wells, treatment plants, reservoirs, pump stations, bulk 
water pipes, and mains. Surface expression of liquefaction was 
observed around the Gear Island Wellfield in Petone, 
Wellington, with damage to the concrete well aprons. The 
single damaged reservoir was the Tawa Reservoir, which had 
minor non-structural cracking; this reservoir is ~50 years old 
and was empty at the time of the event because it was being 
retrofitted. The Silverstream pump station building roof was 
severely damaged by a falling pine tree. 
Across the distribution network up to 15 pipe breaks occurred 
on different pipe material types and sizes. Most of the pipe 
breaks and fittings damage were deemed to be caused by poor 
installation practices or existing weaknesses. For example, a 
hydrant in Jervois Quay, Central Wellington, was damaged 
due to poor installation practice resulting in hydrant baseplate 
bolts popping out. Across Wellington, major breaks (bursts), 
and some other minor pipe failures, resulted in increased 
leakage from the network. After the earthquake, water usage 
in Wellington CBD (Figure 1b) increased from 15,000 to 
20,000 m3/day. In the week prior to 14th November 2016, 
water usage at Wellington port ranged 400 – 1,000 m3/day. 
With ground deformation and pipe damage at the port, in the 
first 2 days after the earthquake 14,000 m3 was lost, which 
equated to an increase in Wellington City water usage of 9 
percent. Because Wellington Water supplies the port at a 
single point, supply was stopped to prevent further leakage. 
Compared to usual maintenance budget expenditure prior to 
the event, there was an increase in maintenance costs after the 
Kaikōura Earthquake due to the discovery of new minor faults 
and damage; future work will address in detail the impacts on 
costs. Damage to the network has continued to manifest, with 
reports of leak-induced ground failure and network water loss 
[35, 36], and leak detection programmes are ongoing. 
With respect to longer-term recovery and resilience, 
monitoring is required to determine effects of demolition and 
construction activities on the wider network. There were initial 
concerns that partial demolition of the Queensgate Mall in 
Lower Hutt, and in particular demolition of building 
foundation piles, would affect the Hutt Aquifer, but 
subsequent investigation showed this not to be an issue. 
Multiple-hazards can also hinder restoration; flooding the day 
after the Kaikōura Earthquake closed some of the state 
highways and isolated parts of the potable water network, and 
creating problems with regard to mobilising repair crews or 
equipment [37]. Wellington Water’s post-event response 
planning now accounts for future closure of state highways in 
the region due to earthquake and other impacts, and repair 
equipment and spare parts have been located on both sides of 
the Wellington Fault to mitigate likely access issues. 
Wastewater System 
The four wastewater treatment plants in Wellington region are. 
Moa Point (Wellington), Seaview (Upper Hutt and Lower 
Hutt; see Figure 1a for location), Porirua and Western 
(Karori).  In the Seaview and Porirua treatment plants, water 
seiching in the secondary clarifier tanks damaged the stilling 
well curtains and their holding rings that baffle mixed liquor 




Figure 2. Damage at the Seaview Waste Treatment Plant. See Figure 1a for location. (a) Displaced curtain panels in the stilling 
well in one of the Seaview treatment plant clarifiers. (b) Damaged ring that holds the curtains of the stilling well in one the 
Seaview treatment plant clarifiers (Photos: Hutt Valley Water Services Ltd).
From an electricity interdependency perspective, the 
earthquake cut power from the Seaview treatment plant for ~3 
hours, and ~8 pump stations lost mains power. Mobilising 
portable generators was not possible due to the tsunami 
inundation warning that was in place after the event. The 
tsunami warning also meant inspecting any of such as outfalls 
in the coastal areas was not possible due to safety concerns. 
After the earthquake, in the Wellington CBD additional water 
infiltrated the wastewater network through damaged pipes, 
with increased pump run hours recorded at a number of pump 
stations. Most infiltration was sourced from the port area that 
experienced ground deformation and pipe damage. As a result, 
there was noticeable in-flow increase at Moa Point treatment 
plant to 50-70 L/s, above the normal flow of 770 L/s. A 
programme of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) wastewater 
pipe inspections was initiated to assess condition and identify 
damage locations – as a result repair work has been 
undertaken to allow flows to Moa Point to return to near-
normal by the end of February 2017. As of March 2017, some 
pump stations were still experiencing over-flow, although the 
exact sources of this extra flow are still to be determined. 
Wider earthquake response and recovery operations had 
implications for protection of the network. For example, with 
demolition of the earthquake-damaged multi-storey building at 
61 Molesworth Street, Wellington, risks to the Wellington 
City wastewater interceptor that passes below the 
building  had to be carefully managed during the demolition 
process, as there is no redundancy in that part of the network. 
Wellington Water Support Services 
From the event response perspective, a key issue for 
Wellington Water was damage to their offices within IBM 
House in Petone, Lower Hutt, which led to staff having to 
operate from both temporary office and locations and homes 
for ~2 months after the event, posing challenges to normal 
business processes and the coordination of repairs and 
restoration. This highlights the importance of business 
continuity planning to support effective operations post-event, 
including decentralising some operations and increased 
investment in information technology to allow staff to work 
efficiently following such disruption. 
Marlborough 
Water Supply Systems 
The 2013 earthquake events had led to replacement of some 
less resilient systems, and the replacement systems generally 
performed well. Water supply wells in Blenheim appeared to 
have survived undamaged, but increased turbidity rendered 
them temporarily unusable and required flushing for ~1 hour. 
In the township of Renwick, 10 km west of Blenheim, high 
turbidity was not that different from that seen in flood events. 
Disturbance of sediment led to blockage of a flow meter by 
small sand-sized particles. Despite Renwick having a high 
proportion of heavily degraded AC wastewater pipelines with 
poor structural integrity, they did not suffer a particularly high 
break rate. Temporary repairs had been effective in restoring 
at least partial service within a week by engaging one to two 
repair crews. Isolation valves had been useful for managing 
the system. This included some post-event installation of 
valves. Overall, there were ~25 breaks across 170 km of 25-
250 mm pipelines in Blenheim only (approximately 1.5 breaks 
per 10 km), mainly on Asbestos Cement (AC) pipes. Figure 3 
shows lateral displacement at the Elizabeth Street footbridge 
in Blenheim, resulting in complete failure of the AC pipeline 
suspended from the bridge, deformation of galvanized steel 
pipelines or ducts suspended on a damaged bridge. 
Storage tanks in the rural water supply systems in the Ward 
and Seddon areas experienced some damage (Figures 1, 4-6). 
Older ferrocrete concrete tanks in Ward installed in the 1950s 
suffered structural damage although one of the tanks remained 
partly operational. Newer tanks (both concrete and 
Polyethylene (PE)) appeared to have performed well. Where 
new concrete tanks had cracked this was minor and is 
expected to seal through autogenous healing. Concrete stave 
tanks had been damaged but remained serviceable, although 
with some additional leakage through cracks, some of which 
are likely to heal over time. If structural integrity has not been 
compromised, patch repair of damaged concrete may extend 
the useful life and defer the need for replacement. The tanks 
were generally located on hill tops, and hence were on good 
ground, and were not affected by liquefaction. As the hillside 
slopes were generally gentle, and the tanks were set back from 
the hillside slopes, the tanks were not affected by slope 
instability. Some cracks in the ground inferred to be due to 
slope displacements were observed just outside the tank 
compound at the Blind River tank site. While modern tanks 
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Figure 3. (a) Elizabeth Street Footbridge, Blenheim. The bridge carries a DN100 galvanized steel duct and an Asbestos Cement 
(AC) water supply pipeline. The galvanized steel duct was deformed and AC pipeline was damaged by displacement of the bridge 
approach. (b) Elizabeth Street Footbridge. AC water pipe damaged by contacting the concrete pillar (yellow arrow), and has 
sheared off at the collar (red arrow). Collars under the bridge show evidence of separation. (c), Blenheim. Detail of Elizabeth 
Street Footbridge AC water pipe sheared off at the collar. (d) Dry Hills Rise, Riverlands. Differential settlement of adjoining 
components observed in a stormwater pumping station. This is believed to be due to consolidation of poorly compacted fill 
saturated by rain, rather than by flotation or by liquefaction settlement. See Figure 1 for locations. 
had performed well, some connecting pipework had failed due 
to excessive movement. Failures included pipes pulling out of 
tanks, Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) solvent cemented joints 
being partially separated in tension, PE pipes partially pulling 
out of the tanks, fracture of threaded connections between 
metal and plastic pipes, loss of seal at over-deflected rocker 
pipe assemblies. The Wheelers Hill and Blind River tanks 
were both relatively recently built and both showed very 
similar forms and distribution of damage. High horizontal 
earthquake accelerations combined with the high vertical 
accelerations in the Ward area appear to have led to 
displacement/rotation of the relatively small tanks that were 
not tied into the ground, leading to failure of the in-ground 
pipe connections between the tanks. The earthquake ground 
shaking may have been amplified at these hilltop sites during 
topographical effects. Observed displacements included 
translational and rotational movement of the tank relative to 
the buried pipeline system, displacement of the tank roof 
relative to the tank. Buried boxes (e.g. valve chambers) around 
the tanks appeared to remain in place while the tank rotated, 
leading to displacement of the pipes relative to the box even 
where the pipe or fittings remained undamaged. Newer tanks 
were more resilient and the pipework layout allowed them to 
be bypassed quickly to restore some service. 
Across Blenheim, Ward and Seddon there were many failures 
in AC pipelines and relatively few in more modern systems, 
although some older AC pipelines that were previously 
believed to be vulnerable due to deterioration had survived 
without apparent damage. Despite Renwick having a high 
proportion of heavily degraded AC pipelines with poor 
structural integrity, they did not suffer a particularly high 
break rate due to small ground motion amplitudes in this 
region. Damage tended to be clustered and was more 
concentrated in the lower Awatere network and Ward where 
there were much higher ground motion amplitudes; six failures 
occurred in an AC pipeline in Ward near a damaged bridge, 
and four AC pipeline failures had occurred near on Kapuru 
Road near Lake Grassmere (Figure 1). The pipelines at Lake 
Grassmere included DN50 AC pipelines that appeared to have 
failed in bending next to the joints and a deteriorated DN100 
line that had longitudinal cracking. Longitudinal cracking 
usually results from excessive pressure, but this pipe had 
apparently failed from contact between the pipeline where it 
crossed a culvert. The DN50 pipelines were relatively 
shallow-buried and would probably have failed in 
compression at the joints if buried deeper. Four AC pipe 
breaks in low-lying paddocks within a small section in the 
Lake Grassmere area indicate that damage was concentrated in 
areas of relatively soft ground with brittle AC pipes, even in 
the absence of liquefaction or lateral spreading. Other reported 
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failures included failure of joints at thrust blocks – possibly 
due to failure of the thrust block – and two failures at 
galvanized service connections on AC pipelines near Lake 
Grassmere.   
In addition to the Elizabeth Street footbridge in Blenheim, 
damage occurred at several other pipe service bridges across 
the region. For example, pipelines between relatively rigid 
bridge abutments and the ground were damaged as observed at 
the Needles Creek bridge site along State Highway 1, north of 
Ward (Figure 7). Observed damage where pipes connect to 
bridges and other structures suggest more flexibility of the 
pipeline system would be important. A water supply well 
pump in Ward failed when movement of the water supply well 
relative to the nearby pump house resulted in the hold down 
bolts pulling out of the concrete base and displacement of the 
pump despite the presence of a rubber bellows joint. While 
this had caused an outage, it was believed that this had 
prevented failure of the pump itself (Figure 8).
 
 
Figure 4. (a) Blind River Tanks. Failure of gibault on PVC due to excessive displacement (Photo: Marlborough District Council). 
(b) Blind River. Shear failure of solvent-cemented PVC joint on overflow pipeline (Photo: Marlborough District Council). (c) 
Wheelers Hill Tanks. Translational and rotational movements of tanks were observed. See Figure 1 for locations. 
 
 
Figure 5. (a) Blind River Tanks. Failure failed threaded fitting due to horizontal displacement. (b) Flaxbourne, failed threaded 
fitting (Photo: Marlborough District Council). (c) Flaxbourne, failed threaded fitting and rotated galvanized pipe. The pipes 
rotated due to lateral ground movement. The seal around the pipes into the tanks has been compromised by the movement (Photo: 
Marlborough District Council). (d) Wheelers Hill. Pipe pulled out of tank wall due to relative displacement (Photo: Marlborough 
District Council). See Figure 1 for locations.
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Figure 6. Ferrocement tanks at Ward, installed in the 1950s. (a) The thin ferrocement walls have failed and the segmented roof 
has collapsed (Photo: Marlborough District Council). (b) The segmented roof and the central pillar have collapsed (Photo: 
Marlborough District Council). 
 
Figure 7. East side of the Needles Creek Bridge north of Ward on the SH1, viewed from the north. Original freshwater pipelines 
have failed and been replaced temporarily with ductile pipes (in black) (Photo: X. Bellagamba). 
 
 
Figure 8. (a) Grundfoss pump in pump house at Ward. When the water supply well was displaced, the galvanized steel pipework 
pulled on the pump. The bolts holding the pump to the concrete slab then failed, causing the pump to topple. (b) Failed PVC 
pipework from the Taimate water supply well near Ward. The pump house building slid on its base, causing the water supply well 
pipework to fail. 
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System redundancy (dual pipelines, ring mains) and the ability 
to isolate damaged parts of the system helped manage the 
system after the events. In Ward, for example, despite severe 
damage to two of the three main concrete reservoirs, damage 
to the pump house and some of the bridge pipes, the situation 
was still quite manageable after the Kaikōura event, since the 
majority of houses had local water storage for ~36 hours. 
Wastewater Systems 
Despite poor soil conditions and moderate shaking levels 
(~0.35 g; See Table 1) experienced towards the end of 
Hardings Road, Riverlands, there was no damage due to 
liquefaction or otherwise to the wastewater treatment plant 
located there. Marlborough District Council staff noted that 
earthenware pipeline failures in Blenheim in 2013 had shown 
an orientation effect with most failures oriented east-west; 
however any such effect remains to be verified by geospatial 
analysis and there were no orientation effects seen in the 2016 
Kaikōura event. Many lines had been inspected with CCTV 
since 2013, and repeat surveys showed new damage in the 
majority of pipelines surveyed since 14th November 2016. 
Cured-In-Place pipe linings had been used in the Blenheim 
CBD to minimise disruption, although restoring service 
connections was an issue. Patch repairs were used as 
temporary fixes for local pipe collapse or other severe damage, 
to allow full line replacement or repair to be deferred. There 
were some concerns over the effectiveness of lining deformed 
pipelines, and of the ability of the liner to withstand being 
installed past protruding sharp fragments, and to survive 
longer term in contact with sharp fragments.  Where pipelines 
had been lined since 2013, these appeared to be still 
functioning. 
Lessons Learnt 
In the Marlborough region, having a robust emergency 
management centre in a safe location with a reliable power 
supply and good computer systems with Geographic 
Information System (GIS) data allowed effective coordination 
of the response for three-waters systems. Loss of power or 
limited power availability could have provided a major barrier 
to effective coordination of the response. Availability of 
power for mobile devices should also be considered (e.g. 
portable chargers for recharging phones and other devices 
when power is not readily available).  
Modern systems (pipelines, tanks and other structures) 
generally performed better than older ones. The majority of 
failures seen were either in older systems known to have 
higher vulnerability, or were due to severe displacements that 
affected both old and new systems.  Pipe joint failures were 
observed at the interface of structures (tanks and bridges) and 
in-ground pipelines, highlighting the need for flexibility of the 
pipeline systems connecting with structures. Brittle pipelines 
appears to be more vulnerable when located in areas of soft 
ground. Tanks often located at hilltops experience amplified 
ground shaking in earthquakes, and it is important that design 
of these tanks allow for the amplified shaking as well as 
vertical ground accelerations. 
Good asset management practice for operational purposes 
(including updating of information, renewals for operational 
purposes, appreciation of criticality, good knowledge of the 
system and a practical contingency plan) helped improve 
overall system resilience. For example, exposure to soft 
aggressive water meant that galvanized steel and copper pipes 
had been replaced with PE, which has good tolerance to 
earthquake loading, so service line damage was low. 
Earthquake emergency shut off valves were set to trigger at 
0.2 g, but the maximum reported PGA at valves was 0.18 g, so 
they did not trigger. Since there were no major system failures 
this did not result in any major issues, but a review of the 
settings may be prudent. 
Kaikōura 
Water Supply Systems 
The Kaikōura supply system is a combination of water supply 
wells and hilltop reservoirs, which feed a reticulated supply to 
Kaikōura township and surrounding suburbs. The 14th 
November 2016 event shut down all power to the system, and 
in combination with severe damage to buried services the 
reticulated supply reduced to zero. At the time of the event one 
reservoir was full, but would have lasted only one day at 
normal demand (I. Walker, pers. comm.). Kaikōura District 
Council (KDC) initiated a rapid programme of assessment and 
repairs, and by 15th November was able to inform residents 
which streets had supply. Residents without supply were 
encouraged to approach others on streets that had supply to 
access water. By 19th November, water stations and had been 
set up at various locations around the township by the New 
Zealand Defence Force, as well as a mobile public shower 
unit. Due to system supply shortages, residents were instructed 
to not use showers in their homes, and to minimise all other 
water use. By 25th November supply had been sufficiently 
restored in the township to enable use of flush toilets and 
showers, although the community was asked to shower only 
every second day, and to not use washing machines or 
dishwashers. This reflected the fragility of the restored supply, 
as well as the inability of the waste water system to receive 
residential grey water (see below). Residents were also 
instructed to not water their gardens. By the beginning of 
December supply had been restored to the Kincaid area north 
of Kaikōura township, but ongoing system leaks did require 
restrictions to be reinstituted until repairs could be completed; 
water was distributed in tankers to these residents, and by 4th 
December reticulated supply had been reinstated. Full supply 
was restored to the Kincaid and Fernleigh water schemes by 
9th December. Throughout the period 14th November to 22nd 
December a boil water notice was placed on all reticulated 
supply, and public water conservation messages were 
broadcast. These restrictions were lifted for most of Kaikōura 
township, suburbs and outlying supply schemes on 23rd 
December, due to system repairs and use of chlorination, 
although some individual households were required to 
continue boiling water before use. People returning to houses 
unoccupied since 14th November were urged to run water for 
10 minutes and flush toilets, and conduct inspections of pipes 
and tanks on their properties. For damaged pipes on residential 
properties, owners were required to attend to these issues on 
their own initiative, sometime using temporary overlanding of 
supply (Figure 9a). 
Ongoing repairs and discovery of leaks did require further 
restrictions and safety notices to be issued in January and 
February 2017. For example, construction work carried out on 
the Waimangarara River water intake to improve the water 
flows necessitated a dirty water notice being issued to some 
areas, and other repair programmes required the urgent issuing 
of further boil water notices. People with their own private 
water supplies were urged to look for obvious signs of damage 
to pipes and water supply well heads, and ensure their supply 
has been tested for the presence of bacteria by accredited 
laboratories. 
Damage to the pressurised reticulated system posed immediate 
problems for firefighting capability in the days after 14th 
November. Despite the presence of one full hilltop reservoir, 
its distribution connections were damaged and this supply was 
inaccessible. The Kaikōura Volunteer Fire Brigade had one 
full water tanker available, but this would have been depleted 
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rapidly in even a small fire event. Due to time of year, warmer 
weather meant that home fires were not in use, and a total fire 
ban was issued across the area. Loss of electrical power to the 
area also mininised fire risk. The loss of firefighting water 
supply was therefore mitigated, but this issue could be 
problematic in future events in colder weather where home 
fires are being used at the time of a damaging earthquake. 
Wastewater and Sanitation Issues 
Wastewater pipes experienced significant damage, 
compromising most of the system that is reticulated to the 
treatment plant north of Kaikōura township. As a result 
residents were advised to use available portaloos already 
present in Kaikōura, or to use buckets or holes dug in gardens 
to dispose of human waste. On November 18th chemical toilets 
were delivered by the New Zealand Defence Force to be 
distributed to all households in Kaikōura, although the 
necessary supply of chemical solution for them was delayed 
by 2-3 days. Residents were informed of chemical toilet dump 
station locations (Figure 9b). Portaloos were also distributed 
across the township, and by November 24th were sited so that 
there was a portaloo within 250 m from every property (Figure 
9b). Due to the inability of the wastewater pipes to function 
from the 14th to 24th November, residents were urged to not 
flush toilets despite the return of reticulated portable water 
supply over this time. The entry on grey water into the system 
was also discouraged by urging residents to not use washing 
machines and dishwashers, and to otherwise minimise water 
use to prevent overloading the system. Environmental 
contamination by wastewater was recognised as a significant 
issue from 14th November, with attendant restrictions on 
entering waterways swimming in the sea (Figure 9c), and 
restriction on water use were also aimed at reducing these 
environmental impacts. Throughout this time, the New 
Zealand Red Cross was present advising the community on 
basic sanitation measures to prevent illness. By November 25th 
wastewater repairs had progressed to the point where toilets 
were able to be flushed in Kaikōura township; further repairs 
enabled the removal of portaloos from some areas by 1st 
December. 
 
Figure 9. Three waters impacts along The Esplanade, Kaikōura. (a) Temporary overlanding of domestic water supply from the 
street connection (yellow arrow) to the house’s kitchen area (red arrow). (b) Portaloo (left) and chemical toilet dump station 
(right). (c) Contaminated water warning, discouraging swimming, fishing and shellfish collection. (d) Differential manhole 
movement of ~3 cm (arrows). (e) Cracking in retaining wall (arrows) surrounding stormwater culvert. (f) Damaged concrete 




Through December 2016, repairs on the wastewater system 
continued and wider functionality returned, but residents were 
advised to retain their chemical toilets in the event of further 
failures. On 21st December the KDC requested residents 
abstain from using the system that night so that functionality 
of the wastewater treatment plant could be assessed at low 
flows, and subsequently wider functionality continued to be 
restored. However, as of 12th February 2017, residents were 
being advised that the system was still vulnerable to rainfall 
inflows and seismic aftershocks, and in the event these 
occurred there needed to be minimal use of the network to 
reduce introduction of greywater. 
There was little physical manifestation of system damage 
along roadways, although at least one manhole was noted to 
have experienced slight differential movement through the 14th 
November event (Figure 9d). Pipe condition assessments via 
CCTV were occurring from the days after the event, supported 
by experience and expertise gained from condition 
assessments conducted in Christchurch through the 2010-2011 
CES [21]. 
Stormwater System 
Transient ground deformation imposed demands on roadways 
and attendant stormwater infrastructure in Kaikōura township. 
These effects manifested as cracked and shatters road dish 
channels and gutters, cracking around culverts that issue to the 
beach (Figure 9e), and disintegration of concrete surrounding 
steel stormwater grates (Figure 9f). Damage to these features 
may pose further issues, as overland flow in rainfall events 
will infiltrate the road subgrade, causing potentially further 
degradation of these corridors. 
SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
We have presented preliminary observations on three waters 
impacts from the Mw7.8 14th November 2016 Kaikōura 
Earthquake on wider metropolitan Wellington, urban and rural 
Marlborough, and in and around Kaikōura township. The three 
waters systems in these areas experienced widespread and 
significant transient ground deformation in response to seismic 
shaking generated by the event. Permanent ground 
deformation was more localised, in contrast to extensive 
liquefaction and lateral spreading phenomena that occurred in 
Christchurch City and surrounding centres during the 2010-
2011 CES [18-28]. 
In Wellington, main impacts to potable water quality were 
from increased turbidity due to seismic stirring of fine 
sediment in the system. Leaks occurred that led to significant 
water losses, particularly around the port area that suffered 
ground deformation and attendant damage to pipes. 
Wellington’s wastewater treatment plants in Seaview and 
Porirua had damage in secondary clarifier tanks due to water 
seiching. Increased water infiltration to the wastewater system 
from damaged pipes was also evident. Interdependencies with 
electricity became apparent when pumps stations were unable 
to be brought back online, and the threat of tsunami also 
compromised immediate assessments of pump stations. 
Disruption to business operations highlights the importance of 
continuity planning for effective responses post-event. 
In Marlborough, most of the failures seen in Blenheim, 
Seddon and Ward were similar to those seen in the 2010-2011 
CES. In the 2016 event, some structures experienced both 
rotational and translational movements that contributed to 
failure, notably in the supply tanks at Wheelers Hills and 
Blind River. This highlights the importance of allowing for 
flexibility in pipe connections with structures such as tanks 
and bridges. System resilience appeared to have improved 
since the 2013 events, mostly as a result of progressive 
renewals that can be attributed to good asset management 
practices. Recovery was aided by a secure emergency building 
with independent power supply, accurate records of the 
pipeline system and networks, and short-term management 
and repair of systems was aided by well-placed control valves.  
In Kaikōura, damage to reservoirs, and pipes and fittings, led 
to loss of water supply and compromised firefighting 
capability. Wastewater damage led to environmental 
contamination, and necessitated restrictions on greywater 
entry into the system to minimise flows. Damage to these 
systems necessitated the importation of tankered and bottled 
water, boil water notices and chlorination of the system, and 
importation of portaloos and chemical toilets. Stormwater 
infrastructure such as road drainage channels was also 
damaged, which could compromise condition of underlying 
road materials. 
Based on these preliminary observations, and similar 
observations made through the 2010-2011 CES, the following 
initial recommendations can be made: 
 In the course of system repairs and ongoing maintenance 
and renewals programmes, flexible connections for pipe 
infrastructure should be considered for bridges, reservoirs 
and tanks, and access chambers. 
 The vulnerability of pipe fittings and connections should 
be assessed, and where possible these should be replaced 
with more ductile or robust materials. Due to damage 
being observed in soils prone to liquefaction and lateral 
spread, these areas of anticipated ground deformation in 
future events will require specific liquefaction 
geotechnical considerations in system design. 
 Detailed reviews of system interdependencies should be 
conducted, in particular dependencies between three 
waters networks and electricity supply. This should 
include assessments of the adequacy of backup 
generation. 
 Asset managers should develop contingency plans in the 
event initial system assessments are hindered by multiple 
or cascading hazards e.g. earthquakes followed by 
tsunami alerts or flood events. 
Future research on three water systems impacts from the   
Mw7.8 14th November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake will include: 
 Collation of GIS datasets of potable, wastewater and 
stormwater systems from relevant asset management 
organisations; datasets will include asset construction 
materials and ages. Also to be collated are break 
locations, failure modes, and repair timelines to assess 
restoration processes. 
 Spatial analyses to correlate failure modes with 
intensities of transient and permanent ground 
deformation. 
 Detailed determination of interdependencies between 
three waters systems and other infrastructure lifelines 
such as electricity, communications and transportation. 
 Collaboration with asset managers to develop resilience 
indices that address components, networks and 
community levels of service in the event of further 
seismic impacts. 
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